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NOTE 
Clearing the Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to 
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits employers, em-
ployment agencies, and labor unions from discriminating against any 
individual "because of" or "on the basis of" the individual's race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin.2 Plaintiffs relying on the dispa-
rate treatment theory of discrimination3 claim that they have been ad-
versely affected by an employment action improperly based on one of 
the statute's prohibited factors.4 In a disparate treatment case, the 
employer "simply treats some people less favorably than others be-
cause of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of 
discriminatory motive is critical .... " 5 These differences in treatment 
were "the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted 
Title VII. "6 
Courts have perceived disparate treatment cases as involving either 
single or "mixed" motives. In the single-motive case, the court views 
the adverse employment action as based solely on either impermissible 
reasons or legitimate ones. Cases involving mixed motives are more 
complex. Although descriptions vary,7 a mixed-motive case essen-
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). For the sake of convenience, this Note usually will refer to 
defendants in Title VII cases as "employers." Generally, the cases discussed focus on specific 
employment actions (e.g. discharge or failure to hire or promote), although the statute is not 
nearly so limited in scope. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324 (1977) (involving challenge to collectively bargained seniority system, with both union and 
employer as defendants). 
3. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
4. Disparate treatment is not the only category or theory of discrimination under Title VII. 
Others include disparate impact, see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (hold-
ing invalid a requirement that applicants have a high school diploma or pass a standardized 
intelligence test), the current effects of past discrimination, failure to make reasonable accommo-
dation, and perhaps reverse discrimination. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d ed. 1983); Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination, 
Mixed Motives, and the Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 85 (1986). 
These categories and theories do not use mixed-motive analysis and are beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
5. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). In con-
trast, disparate impact involves "employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment 
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be 
justified by business necessity." 431 U.S. at 336 n.15. "[l]ntentional ... discrimination [is] an 
unnecessary element in disparate impact cases." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 
2622 (1987). 
6. 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. 
7. Commentators have described the "mixed" or "dual" motive situation in several ways: (1) 
"when some evidence indicates that the employer's actions violated [the statute] but a plausible 
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tially involves an ·employment decision motivated by both permissible 
and impermissible factors. 8 For example, an employee may have been 
fired in part because she is female (an impermissible reason) and in 
part because of excessive absenteeism (a permissible reason). Instead 
of facing the relatively straightforward task of assessing whether the 
employment action was or was not the product of the alleged discrimi-
natory reason, the factfinder in a mixed-motive case must evaluate a 
confluence of factors, all of which, in some way, may have influenced 
the employer's decision. The explanation for the employer's action is 
expanded from either a permissible or impermissible reason, in the 
simple case, to a combination in the mixed-motive case. 
This expansion of asserted causes need not complicate the judicial 
inquiry; in practice, a mixed-motive case presents a distinction without 
a difference. While employers surely do base employment decisions on 
any number of legitimate or illegitimate factors - as distinct from 
situations where they act for one reason alone - a concern for the 
number of different motives is unhelpful in Title VII adjudication. 
The terms "single-motive" and "mixed-motive" may adequately ex-
plain how employment decisions actually occur, but using these two 
categories to classify cases only obscures a more functional distinction 
in the Title VII case law. The courts have already recognized a dis-
tinction between Title VII plaintiffs who present either indirect or di-
rect evidence of discrimination, and have fashioned separate formulas 
of proof for each type of plaintiff. Indirect-evidence plaintiffs proceed 
under the fanliliar three-stage formula of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 9 which allows plaintiffs lacking direct evidence initially to cre-
ate a circumstantial inference of discrimination and then rebut any 
legitimate explanations articulated by the employer. 10 Conversely, di-
and legitimate business reason also may explain the challenged action," Jackson & Heller, The 
I"elevance of the Wright Line Debate: Returning to the Realism a/Erie Resistor in Unfair Labor 
Practice Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 737, 741 (1983) (discussing mixed-motive cases under the 
National Labor Relations Act); (2) when "the plaintiff's showing of illegal motive is sufficiently 
strong that it convinces the trier of fact that the defendant was at least acting out of two (or 
more) motives, one of which was illegal,'' Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex. Problems: 
The Supreme Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VIL 6 INDUS. 
REL. L. J. 353, 374 (1984) (emphasis in original); or (3) when there are "several reasons for [the 
emp)oyer's] action, only one of which is unlawful," Stonefield, supra note 4, at 113. See also 
Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspec-
tive, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292, 293 (1982). 
8. By this approach, an employment action based on several permissible motives or several 
impermissible ones - say, an employer discharging an employee because of absenteeism and 
poor performance, or because of race and religion - still acts with "single" motives. The key to 
the distinction between "single" and "mixed" motives lies in the combination of impermissible 
motive(s) with permissible one(s). 
9. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See infra Part I. 
10. This Note uses the terms "indirect" and "circumstantial" interchangeably. Indirect evi-
dence, if accepted, suggests to the factfinder that, given the proved circumstances, the plaintiff's 
assertion is accurate; the factfinder may infer the assertion's truth from the circumstances. 
"[E]ven if the circumstances depicted are accepted as true, additional reasoning is required to 
reach·the proposition to which it is directed." MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 543 (E. Cleary 3d ed. . ' . 
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rect-evidence plaintiffs - those with evidence that indicates discrimi-
nation without requiring any inference - simply present their 
evidence outright. 11 Employers respond with their evidence, and 
courts, as in any civil litigation, weigh the evidence to determine 
whether the plaintiffs have fulfilled their burden of persuasion.12 
This Note argues that the "mixed-motive" case is simply one vari-
ant of the latter cases, where plaintiffs present direct evidence of dis-
crimination. Where a court is persuaded that the plaititiff has 
presented evidence sufficient to yield an intermediate conclusion that 
mixed motives were involved, the court is acknowledging that the 
plaintiff has presented direct evidence.13 But many courts, viewing the 
mixed-motive case as unique, have devised complex burden-shifting 
1984). See also c. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 60 (1988) 
("'Circumstantial' means evidence which, even if fully credited, may nevertheless fail to support 
(let alone establish) the point in question, simply because an alternative explanation seems as 
probable or more so .•.. "); R. LEMPERT & s. SAL1ZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVI-
DENCE 150 (2d ed. 1983) ("Circumstantial evidence serves as a basis from which the trier of fact 
may make reasonable inferences about a matter in issue."). 
An example of indirect evidence in a Title VII case would be evidence that an obviously 
qualified black person applied for an advertised job opening, was rejected, yet the employer con-
tinued to hold the job open to similarly qualified persons. For examples of direct and circum-
stantial evidence, see Edwards, Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of Proof: 
An Analysis and Critique, 43 w ASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1986); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, 
supra note 4, at 299-308 (2d ed. Cum Supp. 1985). 
11. This Note uses the term "direct evidence" to refer to evidence that, "if accepted as genu-
ine or believed true, necessarily establishes the point for which it is offered •... " C. MUELLER & 
L. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 10, at 60. See also McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 10, at 
543 ("Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue."); R. LEMPERT & 
S. SAL1ZBURG, supra note 10, at 151 ("[D]irect evidence, if believed, requires no further infer-
ence for its bearing on a fact in issue."). In this sense, the term "direct evidence" will refer to 
evidence that, consistent with the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion, establishes that the 
plaintiff "has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 
Such evidence speaks to the employer's intent rather than ,to its underlying motive. Accord-
ing to Professor Welch, intent inv9lves "the conscious purpose with which one acts to effect a 
desired goal or result," while motive involves "the underlying cause or reason moving an agent to 
action." Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Mo-
tive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 734, 738 (1987). An obvious example of direct 
evidence is a statement by a supervisor that the employer "doesn't promote women." Other 
examples include facially discriminatory policies, such as special rules for maternity leave, see, 
e.g., Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ga. 1985), ajfd., 780 
F.2d 987 (1986), or rules expressly disfavoring a group based on its protected characteristic; see, 
e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985) (mandatory retirement age for cock-
pit employees). If that evidence is believed, the court need make no further inference to conclude 
that the employer intentionally discriminated. Unlike the "doesn't-promote-women" example, 
however, most direct evidence is not conclusive, in the sense of not requiring any further support. 
Direct evidence need not prove the matter in issue, but only must speak directly to it. See R. 
LEMPERT & s. SAL1ZBURG, supra note 10, at 151. 
For a fuller discussion of the distinction, in Title VII terms, between direct and indirect 
evidence, see infra Part V. 
12. Title VII plaintiffs, whether presenting direct or indirect evidence, bear the burden of 
persuasion at all times throughout trial. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 253 (1981). 
13. See infra Part IV. 
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approaches that impose the risk of nonpersuasion on the defendant 
once the plaintiff has shown that some discrimination was involved in 
the employment action.14 These courts, by couching their opinions in 
terms of the employer's mixed motivations, mask the true, and more 
basic, reason for shifting the burden to the defendant: the plaintiff has 
already presented compelling direct evidence of discrimination. 15 The 
direct-evidence foundation of the.mixed-motive label makes it unnec-
essary - and doctrinally confusing -to distinguish cases by "single" 
or "mixed" motive; instead, a more rational classification looks to the 
type of evidence presented. 
Part I of this Note describes the indirect-evidence inquiry of Mc-
Donnell Douglas and its basis in the policies underlying Title VII. 
Part II presents the various judicial treatments of cases where direct 
evidence is presented. These three major approaches reflect varying 
views of the burdens of proof regarding Title VII causation, and as-
sume that the plaintiff has already shown some palpable level of dis-
crimination. Part III describes Mt. Healthy City School District Board 
of Education v. Doyle, 16 in which the Supreme Court first devised an 
approach to mixed motives. Although the Mt. Healthy analysis was 
developed for first amendment purposes, the Court has extended it to 
a number of different areas, such as equal protection and labor-man-
agement relations. 17 The analysis also has provided a model for lower 
courts in Title VII cases because the Court has never ruled on the 
mixed-motive issue under Title VII, and because Mt. Healthy involved 
an employment dispute, like Title VII cases. Part IV explains the in-
determinacy and unhelpfulness of the mixed-motive characterization, 
arguing that it obfuscates the critical inquiry into whether the em-
ployer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. The label ig-
nores the fact that nearly every Title VII case is potentially a "mixed-
motive" case, and that cases so labeled are simply those with facts that 
are not compelling in favor of either party. Finally, Part V proposes 
that the direct/indirect evidence approach is a superior method of an-
14. The typical approach requires that, once the plaintiff establishes a threshold level of dis· 
crimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the same adverse employment deci· 
sion would have occurred even absent that discrimination. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 
1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 
1984). 
15. There are, however, some situations where a court might conclude that mixed motives 
were involved even though the plaintiff has proceeded through the McDonnell Douglas (indirect 
evidence) framework. This Note argues that courts in such cases misread the requirements and 
purposes of McDonnell Douglas. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text. 
16. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
17. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (National Labor 
Relations Act); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977) (equal protection and Fair Housing Act); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) 
(state constitutional provision). 
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alyzing the distinction between single- and mixed-motive cases, and 
suggests abandoning mixed-motive terminology altogether. 
I. THE INDIRECT-EVIDENCE DISPARATE 'TREATMENT INQUIRY 
In most disparate treatment cases, 18 plaintiffs attempt to prove dis-
crimination through indirect evidence. The method for doing so is set 
out in the landmark case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 19 Ini-
tially, the Court said, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, which can be done 
by showing (i) that [the complainant] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) 
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; 
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications. 20 
The prima facie case creates a "legally mandatory, rebuttable pre-
sumption,"21 which results in judgment for the plaintiff if the defen-
dant remains silent. 22 
Once the plaintiff successfully clears the prima facie hurdle,23 the 
18. The disparate impact theory logi~y excludes a mixed-motive inquiry for two reasons. 
First, motive is irrelevant to issues of unequal impact. Second, and more important, the theory 
absolves an employer of liability if the discrimination is justified by a legitimate reason falling 
within the definition of "business necessity." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). 
19. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). Although the McDonnell Douglas analysis is only appropri-
ate in cases where the plaintiff lacks direct evidence, see infra notes 106-09 and accompanying 
text, few plaintiffs are able to acquire direct evidence, so the formula is used in the large majority 
of disparate treatment cases. See, e.g., Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 826 F.2d 230, 236 (3d 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 732 (1988); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 
F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Unless the employer is a latter-day George Washington, employ-
ment discrimination is as difficult to prove as who chopped down the cherry tree."); Brief for the 
American Psychological Assn. as Amicus Curiae, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 
(U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988); Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate 
Treatment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1114, 1116 (1988). 
The treatises in this area, however, have confusingly spoken of McDonnell Douglas as the 
standard disparate treatment inquiry, rather than as only one of two disparate treatment options, 
the other being a direct-evidence inquiry. See, e.g., B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 
5 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1985); 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: 
PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES§ 50.10 (1987). 
20. 411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted). Although this language deals with a race discrimina-
tion plaintiff, it has been applied, in some form, to all types of discrimination actionable under 
Title VII. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981) 
(sex discrimination); Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1428 (5th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986) (national origin discriinination). It has also been applied to 
proof of discrimination under other statutes. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 
U.S. 111, 118 (1985) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 
116-17 (8th Cir. 1985) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973). This language has been applied to all forms 
of employment action, though with some variation. See A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 19, § 50.22. 
21. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7. 
22. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
23. The prima facie requirements do not pose a difficult burden for the plaintiff with a non-
868 . Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:863 
employer must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" 
for its action. 24 This burden is one of production, not persuasion:25 
the employer need only "set forth . . . the reasons for the plaintiff's 
rejection" to rebut successfully the presumption raised by the plain-
tiff's prima facie case.26 
The third and final stage of the inquiry - the pretext stage -
shifts the burden back to the plaintiff "to demonstrate that the prof-
fered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision."27 
This final shift reflects the plaintiff's "ultimate" burden of persua-
sion. 28 By ruling out the employer's asserted motives, the plaintiff ef-
fectively proves to the court29 that he or she was "the victim of 
intentional discrimination."30 Given the relative ease with which a 
nonfrivolous plaintiff can meet the prima facie burden,31 and the rela-
frivolous claim. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("The burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment is not onerous."); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in 
Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1979). 
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
25. "The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of dis· 
crimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, 
for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it 
was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (emphasis added). 
26. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (footnote omitted). Despite appearances, this burden is not de 
minimis, because the defendant's explanation "must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment," 
450 U.S. at 255, and must be admissible into evidence, 450 U.S. at 255 n.9. 
27. 450 U.S. at 256. 
28. 450 U.S. at 256. 
29. Because Title VII does not provide for jury trials, all proof must be made to the court. 
See, e.g., Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1980); Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 
F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1978); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). 
30. 450 U.S. at 256. It is unclear what the Court meant, in this context, by "intentional 
discrimination." Professor Bartholet has stated that a plaintiff at stage III "must provide persua-
sive proof of illicit intent in order to prevail." Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under 
Title VIL· United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIP. L. REV. 12011 
1206 (1982). However, Bartholet went on to point out that "(s]uch proof may consist simply of 
evidence that the reasons profferred by defendant are not credible. Indeed there may be no 
additional presentation of evidence by plaintiff at all." Id. (footnote omitted). Apparently, then, 
the Court would allow a plaintiff to prevail under McDonnell Douglas by merely proving con-
structive intent, not requiring actual intent (a conscious purpose to discriminate). This conclu-
sion is bolstered by the Court's casual mixing of the terms "motive" and "intent," which 
professor Welch has criticized. See Welch, supra note 11, at 763-72. Indeed, the Court has, in 
numerous other areas, including employment, applied the common law rule that an actor is 
"held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct." Id. at 771 n.217 (quoting Radio 
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954)). In addition, the Court has occasionally read 
the term "intentionally discriminated" to mean "whether the particular employment decision at 
issue was made on the basis of race," rather than to mean that the employer intended to mistreat 
a person on impermissible grounds, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S: 867, 
875 (1984). 
Professor Welch has argued ihat the only relevant consideration to a determination of pretext 
is the employer's motive rather than its intent. Welch, supra note 11, at 738. "The inquiry is not 
to fathom an employer's intention, but to ascertain what factors led to the decision in question, 
what realities motivated or caused the employer to act as he or she did." Id. at 778. Evidence of 
intent, as this Note argues, is relevant in the direct-evidence case, where the McDonnell Douglas 
inquiry is inapposite. See infra Part V. 
31. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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tively light burden placed on the employer in rebuttal, 32 the typical 
disparate treatment case will advance to the pretext stage, where the 
ultimate issue of liability will be determined. 33 
The purpose of this somewhat elaborate three-stage process is to 
aid plaintiffs who genuinely may be victims34 of discrimination but are 
unable to obtain direct evidence to prove it. As the Court has ex-
plained, McDonnell Douglas forces a plaintiff to "demonstrate at least 
that his rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate 
reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job applic.ant: an 
absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy 'in 
the job sought."35 The plaintiff's implicit ruling-out of these two rea-
sons, the Court said, "is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create 
an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one. "36 
Once the case reaches the pretext stage - after the plaintiff has 
established a prima facie case that the action was discriminatory, and 
the defendant has rebutted by articulating a legitimate motivation -
the inference of discrimination is no longer necessary. Instead, the 
focus shifts to whether the defendant's stated reason was the true rea-
son for its decision. If the court finds that it was not, it concludes that 
the employer intentionally discriminated and the plaintiff prevails. 37 
32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
33. Furnish, supra note 7, at 357 ("[D)isparate treatment cases are won or lost on the pretext 
issue .•.. ") (footnote omitted), 364-67; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 7 (2d ed. 
Cum. Supp. 1985) ("The vast majority of disparate treatment cases continue to depend on the 
issue of pretext . . . . "). 
34. The term "victim" is somewhafvalue-laden. It may imply a focus solely on the result of 
the employer's decision rather than on the process. For example, a court might look to whether 
the "same decision,. would have been made had the employer not considered an illegal factor. 
See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S; 274 (1977), discussed in Part III infra. Seen in this way, the 
employer's consideration of the illicit factor has truly "victimized" the plaintiff by placing her in 
a worse position than if the discrimination had not occurred. When, however, "the same deci-
sion would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered . . . , the 
complaining party ... no longer fairly [can] attribute the injury complained of to improper 
consideration of a discriminatory purpose." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21 (1977). In this instance, the illicit purpose has not affected 
the plaintiff in a tangible way, so the plaintiff should not be considered a victim. 
However, it is not necessary to conceive of "victims" in this result-oriented way. The Eighth 
Circuit's approach to mixed-motive cases, for example, awards limited relief to plaintiffs who can 
prove that discrimination was a "discernible" factor in the employer's decision, regardless of 
whether that factor had a determinative effect. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1323-24 and infra notes 
64-69 and accompanying text. Professor Stonefield has argued, similarly, that Title VII should 
prohibit the "non-determinative" discrimination that a "but for" or "same decision" inquiry 
allows. "If conduct is discriminatory but not determinative of the decision, the but-for test finds 
no wrongdoing .... The discrimination, having been found to be non-determinative, is deemed 
'harmless,' without any further reflection on its discriminatory nature." Stonefield, supra note 4, 
at 119-20 (footnotes omitted). Both Stonefield and the Eighth Circuit envision relief for plaintiffs 
"victimized" in a nondeterminative way. See 778 F.2d at 1323-24; Stonefield, supra note 4, at 
123-34. . 
35. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). 
36. 431 U.S. at 358 n.44 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs with direct evidence of discrimination 
do not proceed under McDonnell Douglas. See infra Part II. 
37. "At [the pretext) stage, the McDonnell-Burdine presumption 'drops from the case,' and 
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In effect, the plaintiff has ruled out the "two most common legitimate 
reasons"38 that might explain the employer's action, and has per-
suaded the court that the employer, in addition, failed to act for its 
stated, legitimate reason. By this process of inference, the court is able 
to discern whether the employer discriminated, without requiring a 
plaintiff to produce the "smoking gun" memo that would yield that 
conclusion directly. 
II. OPTIONS IN THE DIRECT-EVIDENCE CASE 
Direct-evidence plaintiffs, unlike those pursuing the McDonnell 
Douglas inquiry, must prove that the alleged discriminatory motive 
caused the adverse employment action. 39 It remains unclear, however, 
how strong a causal link is required. The Supreme Court has never 
clarified the precise degree of causation necessary for a successful dis-
parate treatment claim. One oft-cited clue was provided in McDonald 
v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 40 In a footnote, the Court stated: 
"[N]o more is required to be shown than that race was a 'but for'. 
cause."41 This passage appears to make clear that plaintiffs must es-
tablish "but for" causation - that is, show that absent the discrimina-
tion, the adverse action would not have occurred.42 But in that same 
footnote, the Court contradicted itself by stating that "[t]he use of the 
term 'pretext' ... does not mean ... that the Title VII plaintiff must 
show that he would have in any event been rejected or discharged 
solely on the basis of his race, without regard to the alleged deficien-
cies. "43 The Court thus suggested both that a plaintiff must show, at 
minimum, "but for" causation, and that a plaintiff need not show that 
the adverse action would have occurred if di~crimination alone were 
'the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity,' " Le., whether the employer " 'inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'" Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. 
at 253, 255) (citations omitted). By "drops from the case," the Court meant that the employer's 
articulated explanation - which was sufficient to extend the inquiry into the third stage - has 
overridden the initial presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie showing. The 
factfinder then determines whether the plaintiff can persuade it that the employer's explanation is 
pretextual, either by showing "that the defendant more likely discriminated, or by discrediting 
the explanation proffered." Note, supra note 19, at 1127 (emphasis deleted). 
38. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. 
39. Title VII requires some causation, see sources cited in Brief for the United ·states as 
Amicus Curiae at 8-10, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988), but 
in McDonnell Douglas cases, causation is presumed. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
40. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
41. 427 U.S. at 282 n.10. 
42. Although stated as a minimum, this standard is likely a maximum, since there is little 
more a plaintiff can be required to prove than "but for" causation. One more stringent approach 
would be a "sole factor" test, but Title VIl's legislative history rejects such a standard. See C. 
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 266 n.10 (1988); 
Brodin, supra note 7, at 296-97. 
43. 427 U.S. at 282 n.10. 
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present - two positions that appear at odds.44 This confusing refer-
ence and others,45 combined with inconclusive legislative history,46 
have left muddled th~ question of causation under Title VII.47 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 48 presents the Court with an opportu-
nity to clarify this conceptual muddle. The petitioner's main conten-
tion on appeal is that Title VII plaintiffs must show "that forbidden 
discrimination was a 'but for' cause of the challenged employment de-
cision. "49 The respondent has countered by arguing that plaintiffs 
need only prove that the decision "was caused, in part, by discrimina-
tion," and that employers can limit relief "by proving that the same 
decision would have been made absent discrimination."50 
The appeals court in Hopkins classified the various lower-court ap-
proaches to direct-evidence cases according to the quantum of proof 
required for the trier to conclude that a discriminatory motive was 
present.51 This Note's analysis, in contrast, focuses on the allocation 
of the burden to prove causation in direct-evidence cases, and assumes 
that the plaintiffs have already proven the existence of a discrimina-
tory motive on the employer's part. Each of the approaches described 
makes use of a "but for" or "same-decision" analysis.52 
44. Professor Brodin characterized this footnote of McDonald as "cryptic." Brodin, supra 
note 7, at 301 n.40. The Court apparently has not expanded on it in subsequent cases. Brodin 
noted in 1982 that "[s]ince McDonald, the Court has discussed the causation question only in the 
quite distinct context of title VII class actions .•.. " Id. at 302. And a 1989 LEXIS search did 
not reveal subsequent Supreme Court references to the footnote. 
45. In East Texas Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 n.9 (1977), the Court 
suggested further that it favored a "but for" inquiry. It stated: "Even assuming, arguendo, that 
the company's failure even to consider the applications was discriminatory, the company was 
entitled to prove at trial that the respondents had not been injured because they were not quali-
fied and would not have been hired in any event." This places the burden of proving "same 
decision" on the defendant, but as in Mt Healthy, only after initial proof by the plaintiff of 
discrimination. 
46. See Brodin, supra note 7, at 294-99. 
47. For extensive theoretical discussions of Title VII causation that frequently draw upon 
causation theories in the tort and criminal law areas, see the amicus briefs of the United States 
and the AFL-CIO in Hopkins. Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 23-29 and Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-15, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. 
argued Oct. 31, 1988). 
48. Price Waterhouse, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988). 
49. Brief for Price Waterhouse at 21, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. ar-
gued Oct. 31, 1988). This is the option described in infra Part II.A. 
50. Brief of Ann B. Hopkins at 20, 31, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. 
argued Oct. 31, 1988). The respondent did not indicate whether she preferred the options set out 
at infra Part 11.B. or 11.C. But she did note the importance of various kinds of nonaffirmative 
relief, such as injunctions against future discrimination, see id. at 34, suggesting that she supports 
the approach described at infra Part II.C. 
51. The court noted that some circuits require proof of a "but for" cause, some require proof 
that discrimination was a "substantial factor," and one requires proof that discrimination played 
"some part." 825 F.2d at 470 n.8. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988). 
52. Several commentators have criticized the result-oriented focus of these analyses. See 
Stonefield, supra note 4, at 119-20; see also infra note 85. 
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A. Placing the ''But For" Burden on the Plaintiff 
Under this approach, the plaintiff always bears the burden of prov-
ing that discrimination was a "but for" cause of the adverse action. 
The proffered direct evidence has no independent value other than 
helping the plaintiff establish "but for" causation. There is no shift in 
or weakening of burdens simply because the plaintiff was able to mar-
shall direct evidence that some discrimination occurred. 
The Fifth Circuit's approach is illustrative. Jack v. Texaco Re-
searc~ Center53 involved a discharge allegedly in retaliation for the 
plaintiff's earlier exercise of Title VII-protected rights.54 The trial 
judge had found that the employer had two motives for discharging 
the plaintiff: her excessive absenteeism and the proscribed retaliation. 
The appeals court required the plaintiff "to prove that she would not 
have been discharged absent the forbidden motive."55 The court con-
tinued by stating that the plaintiff "must prove that, whether she was a 
superb stenographer or one with serious fault, she would not have 
been discharged at that time had she not complained. "56 
B. Placing the Burden on the Defendant To Prove ''Same Decision" 
One attempt to avoid the potential unfairness in requiring that 
plaintiffs, who already have proven that some discrimination tainted 
the employer's decision, prove further that the discrimination was the 
"but for" cause57 is to shift to the defendant the burden of proving 
53. 743 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1984). 
54. Section 704(a) of Title VII states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment .•. tiecause 
he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro· 
ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982). 
55. 743 F.2d at 1130. 
56. 743 F.2d at 1131. See also Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F. 2d 910 (3d Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 469. U.S. 892 (1984). Lewis involved claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981 and 1983 by a black woman who alleged that her failure to be promoted, despite creden· 
tials superior to the promoted white employee, was based on race. The employer countered that 
the plaintiff had poor work habits. The court, following the Supreme Court's footnote in Mc· 
Donald, concluded that a "but for" standard is appropriate, and upheld the trial court's jury 
instructions which asked whether the plaintiff "would ... have been promoted ..• but for the 
fact that she is black." 725 F.2d at 913. The trial judge went so far as to state that this "but for" 
determination was the "polestar" around which all aspects of the case revolved, and was requisite 
to a finding ofliability. 725 F.2d at 917-18. See also McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Assn. Coun-
cil, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1068 (1988) ("[T]he employee must 
establish that the discriminatory motivation was a determining factor in the challenged employ-
ment decision in that the employee would have received the job absent the discriminatory 
motivation."). 
57. Professor Stonefield has argued that the "but for" inquiry allows discriminating employ-
ers to escape Title VII liability. He posed a hypothetical mixed-motive scenario as one in which 
an employer says to an applicant: "You don't have the necessary two years experience; you are 
twenty-fifth on the list [for only three job openings]; and, besides, we already have too many 
black salespeople and so we wouldn't have hired you anyway." Stonefield, supra note 4, at 93 
(footnote omitted). A "but for" inquiry would absolve this employer of liability, even though the 
employer has clearly acted in violation of the statute. 
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that the discrimination was not the "but for" cause.'58 Other appeals 
courts have shifted the "but for" inquiry's risk of nonpersuasion to the 
defendant - in the form of a "same decision" test. By so doing, the 
courts have created an affirmative defense for the employer, allowing it 
to escape liability if it can prove that the same adverse decision would 
have been made absent the discrimination. If the defendant prevails 
on this question, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. 
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle 59 and 
its progeny embody this approach. In NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., 60 for example, the Court upheld an NLRB finding that 
once an employee proves that a discharge was motivated, or substan-
tially caused, by the exercise of rights protected by the National Labor 
Relations Act, the employer must show that the action would have 
occurred regardless of the employee's activity. 61 In so holding, the 
Court accepted the NLRB's designation of this burden-shift as an "af-
firmative defense."62 Several appeals courts have adopted this ap-
proach for Title VII cases. 63 
C. Placing the ''Same Decision" Burden on the Defendant, but 
Separating Liability and Remedy 
While the shift of the "but for" burden, in the form of a "same 
decision" affirmative defense, removes much of the potential unfair-
ness to plaintiffs, it also creates the possibility that employers will be 
able to taint employment decisions with discrimination but still escape 
liability if the discriminatory factor was not controllipg. Some courts 
have sought to accommodate this possibility by separating liability and 
remedy. By this approach, not only does the burden shift to the em-
ployers to prove "same decision," but the plaintiffs become entitled to 
58. For a discussion of the courts' policy rationales for burden shjfting in mixed-motive 
cases, see infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. 
Comparison of this approach to the previous one illustrates the only difference between the 
"but for" and "same decision" tests. Both involve the same inquiry - speculation as to what 
would have occurred absent discrimination - but the former involves burdening the plaintiff, 
while the latter burdens the defendant. · 
59. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See infra Part III for a discussion of this case. 
60. 462 U.S. 393 (1983). 
61. 462 U.S. at 400. 
62. 462 U.S. at 402. 
63. See, e.g., Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987) (once plaintiff proves 
discrimination is "motivating" factor, defendant must prove by preponderance of evidence that 
same decision would have been made absent discrimination); Haskins v. United States Dept. of 
the Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 1197-98 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 68 (1987) (once plaintiff 
establishes that adverse decision "more likely than not" was motivated by discrimination, de-
fendant must prove it would have taken same action absent impermissible motivation); Joshi v. 
Florida State Univ. Health Center, 763 F.2d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 
(1985) (proof of discrimination creates presumption of entitlement to relief, which defendant can 
rebut by proving the same decision would have been reached "absent the discrimination"). 
874 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:863 
various forms of preliminary relief when they are able to show the 
presence of a discriminatory motive to some degree. 
In the Eighth Circuit, for example, once the plaintiff proves that 
discrimination "played some part" in the employment decision, she is 
immediately entitled to a declaratory judgment, partial attorney's fees, 
or an injunction. 64 Next, if the defendant fails to establish its affirma-
tive defense - that the same decision would have been made absent 
the already-proven discrimination - by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the defendant is further liable for appropriate affirmative relief, 
including reinstatement, retroactive promotion, and back pay. 65 
Courts that follow this approach66 claim that it best serves two 
major purposes of Title VII: eliminating all traces of discrimination 
from the workplace, 67 and avoiding windfalls to plaintiffs who have 
been discharged, or otherwise adversely affected, for legitimate rea-
sons. 68 By reconciling these joint purposes, proponents claim, the ap-
pr.oach adequately deters actual or potential wrongdoers while not 
placing plaintiffs in a better position than they would have been had 
the violation not occurred. 69 
64. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane). 
65. 778 F.2d at 1324. See generally Note, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: The Eighth 
Circuit's Treatment of Dual Motive Cases- Bibbs v. Block, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 941 (1986); 
Note, Title VII Mixed-Motive Cases: The Eighth Circuit Adds a Second Track of Liability and 
Remedy, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 155 (1986). 
66. See Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1982); Fadhl v. City 
& County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[I]t was proper for the district 
court to find initial liability for employment discrimination without reference to whether the 
[plaintifi] ultimately would have received employment •.•• "). 
Professor Brodin's important article was the first to advocate this bifurcation of liability and 
remedy. See Brodin, supra note 7, at 323-26. 
67. As Professor Brodin has observed: 
[Title VII] has also been reail to provide the plaintiff with an enforceable right to have 
decisions regarding him made without regard to any of the forbidden criteria; or, put an-
other way, the employer's failure to make the challenged decision without considering such 
factors is itself a violation of title VII, regardless of the results of such failure. 
Brodin, supra note 7, at 318 (emphasis in original). See also Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322. 
68. Section 706(g) of the statute reads: 
No order of the court shall require ... the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individ-
ual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual ••. was 
refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other 
than discrimination ..• in violation of [this statute]. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). A plaintiff awarded affirmative relief despite losing on the "same 
decision" question would receive a windfall (more relief than he deserves) and such relief would 
violate the terms of this section. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322. 
In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Intl. Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), a Title 
VII case involving affirmative action, the Court held that § 706(g) does not limit relief to actual 
victims of discrimination. Rather, it prevents a windfall to plaintiffs who do establish that dis-
crimination occurred but cannot establish that the same decision would have been made absent 
discrimination. 478 U.S. at 473-75. See also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 
U.S. 561, 617-18 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
69. See Brodin, supra note 7, at 325. 
Professor Stonefield appears to adopt this bifurcated standard in the direct-evidence case, 
although he addresses the issue differently than have the courts and other commentators. He 
argues that the "but for'' analysis, which is common to all three of these approaches, is underin-
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO MIXED-MOTIVE 
CASES: MT. HEALTHY V. DOYLE 
875 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the mixed-motive 
question in a Title VII case, it has dealt with these issues in other 
contexts, including employment. In Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle, 70 the Court faced an employment dis-
charge explicitly based upon mixed motives. Doyle, a public school 
teacher, was discharged71 following a number of incidents, including 
making offensive gestures to students, arguing with another teacher 
and school cafeteria employees, and referring to some students as 
"sons of bitches." Additionally, he notified a radio station about a 
memorandum circulated to selected teachers regarding a faculty dress 
code, and the station broadcast the content of the memorandum as a 
news item. Later, the school board refused to rehire him for the next 
school year. 72 In a statement explaining the reasons for the action, the 
superintendent noted Doyle's "lack of tact in handling professional 
matters," but went on to cite the radio station incident and the use of 
obscene gestures. 73 Doyle sued, claiming the discharge was based on 
the exercise of his protected right of free speech. 
The Court noted initially that if the discharge was motivated solely 
by Doyle's exercise of his rights, it would be unlawful, entitling him to 
reinstatement. 74 Yet the Court was troubled by the fact that, as the 
district court put it, "there did exist in fact reason ... independent of 
any First Amendment rights or exercise thereof, to not extend ten-
elusive in its failure to account for discrimination that does not affect the result of the employer's 
action, and requires a hopelessly difficult "counterfactual" inquiry into "what might have hap-
pened" had discrimination not been present. Stonefield, supra note 4, at 118 (emphasis in origi-
nal). His solution is to focus on the employer's "substantive conduct" (i.e. whether it considered 
an impermissible factor) and the plaintiff's "substantive rights" (i.e. whether discrimination 
played a role in her evaluation). Id. at 122. This "allows and requires the decision-maker explic-
itly to evaluate all the discriminatory conduct in the case .•. and to impose liability when the 
conduct is covered by the statute." Id. at 174. The bifurcated standard avoids the problems 
Stonefield identifies with the "but for'' test by awarding preliminary relief upon the plaintiff's 
proof of "discernible discrimination." Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322. Stonefield appears, however, to 
call for a wider variety of remedies than do other advocates of the bifurcated approach: "The 
eradication, deterrence and compensation purposes [of Title VII] are better served by broader 
relief. The limited remedies are inadequate to compensate the injuries caused by discrimination." 
Stonefield, supra note 4, at 128 n.162. See also id. at 123-34. 
70. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
71. Actually, the school board failed to renew Doyle's contract, 429 U.S. at 282, but because 
he did not hold a tenured position, the board's inaction was tantamount to a discharge. 
72. 429 U.S. at 281-82. 
73. 429 U.S. at 281-83, 283 n.1. 
74. 429 U.S. at 283-84. This constitutional protection is the functional equivalent of the 
statutory prohibitions.ofTitle VII. The Court.here effectively restated the disparate treatment 
theory: if the employment action is grounded in impermissible motives, the action is illegal, and 
relief is warranted. 
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ure."75 The Court's solution was to devise a two-pronged approach 
designed to illustrate whether Doyle truly was victimized by an unlaw-
ful employment decision. 76 First, it required that Doyle bear the ini-
tial burden to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, 
and that the conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the 
employer's decision.77 Second, it shifted the burden to the school 
board to prove "that it would have reached the same decision ... even 
in the absence of the protected conduct"78 - a standard that has come 
to be known as the "same decision" test. 79 
Two considerations led to this result. One was a desire to avoid a 
windfall - by insulating from discipline or discharge - to plaintiffs 
who happen to engage in protected conduct yet could legitimately be 
discharged for other reasons. 80 The second was a comparison of 
Doyle's circumstances to criminal law cases in which confessions were 
"tainted" by improper procedures, but in which convictions were up-
held because the same decision would have occurred even without the 
impropriety. 81 
Mt. Healthy has had a great impact on, and has plainly become the 
paradigm case for, analysis of mixed-motive discrimination. The 
Court has applied its analytical framework to several other areas 
where discriminatory motivation is at issue, most notably in unfair 
75. 429 U.S. at 285, quoting unreported opinion of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio. 
76. In formulating the test in Mt. Healthy, the Court did not use the term "mixed-motive." 
77. 429 U.S. at 287. 
78. 429 U.S. at 287. On remand, the district and appeals courts held that Doyle's contract 
would not have been renewed even without the radio incident. The other incidents indicated to 
those courts that, "while appellant Doyle had some fine qualities as a teacher, he also had a very 
quick temper." Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 670 F.2d 59, 61 (6th Cir. 
1982). 
79. The "same decision" test is identical to the "but for'' test, which asks whether the dis-
crimination was the "but for" cause of the adverse action. Any distinction between the two is 
semantic only. A "same decision" inquiry speculatively asks whether the result would have oc· 
curred had the factor not been considered; a "but for" inquiry asks whether the factor was detet· 
minative in bringing about the result. See Stonefield, supra note 4, at 117-18. The Court has 
recognized that the "same decision" and "but for'' tests are the same. See Givhan v. Western 
Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979). 
However, the two tests, at least in lower-court Title VII cases, may reflect allocation of the 
burden of persuasion onto different parties, with the "same decision" test favoring the plaintiff 
and the "but for'' test favoring the defendant. See supra Parts II.A. and 11.B. 
80. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist explained: 
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment question resolved 
against him because of constitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate ought 
not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his 
performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply 
because the protected conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of its 
decision. 
429 U.S. at 286. 
81. 429 U.S. at 286-87. See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (upholding 
conviction despite an arguably involuntary confession because the defendant had, in addition, 
entered a voluntary guilty plea). 
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labor practice cases under the National Labor Relations Act. 82 The 
case's reasoning has been widely accepted by lower courts in Title VII 
cases. 83 Unfortunately, when used as an analytical tool in Title VII 
cases,· the notion of mixed motives only clouds the more important 
issues of proof and causation that the courts must c01.ifront. 
IV. THE MIXED-MOTIVE MISNOMER 
The "mixed motive" classification is unhelpful and unnecessary in 
the litigation of Title VII disparate treatment claims:84 While employ-
ment decisions, in a "real world" sense, certainly are based routinely 
on more than one motive, 85 the prevailing case law illustrates that cat-
82. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (accepting the 
NLRB's earlier adoption of Mt. Healthy as the paradigm for mixed-motive cases under the 
NLRA); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1169 (1980), enforcement 
granted, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). 
The Court has also applied Mt. Healthy to cases challenging actions by official bodies, see 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) 
(village's denial of rezoning); and to cases challenging state constitutional provisions, see Hunter 
v. Underwood, 471' U.S. 222, 232 (1985) (section of Alabama Constitution disenfranchising, 
among others, persons convicted of crimes "involving moral turpitude"). ' 
83. See infra note 87; see also Stonefield, supra note 4, at 116-17, 116-17 nn.112-16 (citing 
cases); Note, An Evaluation of the Proper Standard of Causation in the Dual Motive Title VII 
Context: A Rejection of the "Same Decision" Standard, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 209, 214 (1985). 
The Supreme Court may soon discuss the mixed-motive issue under Title VII. See Price , 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988). The predominant questions 
on appeal relate to the propriety of evidence of "sex stereotyping" to prove a Title VII violation 
and to whether burden-shifting is appropriate once a plaintiff has presented some evidence of 
discrimination. See Brieffor Petitioner at I; Brieffor Respondent at i; 56 U.S.L.W. 3601 (Mar. 
8, 1988). This latter issue raises the mixed-motive question indirectly, since it involves the in-
quiry that many courts have adopted in response to the perceived uniqueness of the mixed-
motive case. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text. 
84. Although this Note's analysis is confined to Title VII, it presumably would be applicable 
to mixed-motive cases arising under other statutes as well. The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), for example, is closely analogous to 
Title VII. See Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REv. 621 (1983). 
85. There is a strong tension between acknowledging the "real world" motivations of em-
ployers and fashioning a legal regime that can account for them. As Stonefield noted, the mixed-
motive case "reflects the contrast between the discrete nature of the regulatory prohibition and 
the richness of human interactions .... It can rarely be said that any single stimulus is totally 
responsible for a particular act; many factors normally contribute." Stonefield, supra note 4, at 
113. 
The Supreme Court itself has recognized this tension in connection with public decisionmak-
ing. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitain Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 
(1976) ("Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body ... made a decision 
motivated solely by a single concern."); Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256, 277 (1979) ("Discriminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either is a 
factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it is not."). 
Moreover, many employment actions may involve subconscious discrimination, making a 
determination of the employer's motives especially difficult. S.ee generally Brief for the American 
Psychological Assn. as Amicus Curiae, at 10-20, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 
(U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988) (influence of sex stereotyping on perceptions of female employees); 
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing the intent requirement in equal protection analysis); Friedman, 
Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action Under Title VII: The Access Princi-
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egorization based on the number of motives fails to advance the cru-
cial inquiry necessary in disparate treatment actions: determining 
whether "the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plain-
tiff."86- Rather, the mixed-motive characterization can prevent 
factfinders from focusing on the true principles of disparate treatment 
theory necessary to resolve the ultimate question at issue. 
When a court classifies a case as "mixed motive," it ostensibly be-
lieves that the employment action did involve the requisite clash be-
tween "good" and "bad" motives. The courts that have created 
special "tests" appropriate to the mixed-motive case have attempted to 
strike a balance between the "good" motive and the "bad." Usually 
following Mt. Healthy, these courts have asked: Given that the plain-
tiff has proven that some discrimination was present, would the em-
ployer have reached the same, adverse decision absent that 
discrimination?87 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has framed the issue 
as follows: 
[I]n order to prove a violation of Title VII, a plaintiff need demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's decision to take 
an adverse action was more likely than not motivated by a criterion pro-
scribed by the statute. Upon such proof, the employer has the burden to 
prove that the adverse employment action would have been taken even 
in the absence of the impermissible motivation, and that, therefore, the 
discriminatory animus was not the cause of the adverse employment 
action.88 
Such a test presupposes that the plaintiff has proven a threshold level 
of discrimination. Indeed, any formulation of what constitutes an ac-
pie, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 41, 44 (arguing that Title VII should ensure that minorities are not 
"deprived of meaningful access to employment opportunities"); Welch, supra note 11, at 752 
("Only a framework which attacks the routine, unreflective reliance on prejudice in employment 
decisions will remove discriminatory barriers."); Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stere-
otyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345 (1980); Comment, 
Help Wanted: An Expansive Definition of Constructive Discharge Under Title Vil 136 U. PA. L. 
REV. 941 (1988) (discussing forms of unconscious workplace discrimination). 
86. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983), quoting Texas Dept. of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980). In the quoted passage, the Court 
apparently meant to limit its conclusion to disparate treatment cases, where intentional discrimi-
nation is at issue, although it did not say so. Disparate impact cases do not require intent. See 
supra note 5. 
Despite the language of intent in cases like Burdine and Aikens, the Court's approach to 
disparate treatment has been motive-based rather than intent-based. When the Court defines the 
term "intentionally discriminated," it cites passages that speak only of treating people differently, 
not acting with a conscious purpose. See Welch, supra note 11, at 771; see generally supra note 
30. But see Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2633 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("A disparate treatment claim ... requires proof of a discriminatory· 
purpose. Of course, • "[d]iscriminatory purpose" implies more than intent as volition or intent as 
awareness of consequences.' It implies that the challenged action was taken 'at least in part 
"because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.'.") (citations 
omitted). 
87. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1985); Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988). 
88. Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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tion based on "mixed" motives must assume that at least some dis-
crimination was present, for without that primary determination, 
there is nothing for the permissible motive to counter. 89 
Before finding a discriminatory motive in mixed-motive cases, 
though, a court first must have weighed the parties' evidence. A plain-
tiff would not assert mixed motives in the pleadings; to do so would 
dilute the claim that the employment action was taken "because of" 
an illegal factor. Similarly, an employer would not initially ask the 
court to use a mixed-motive analysis, because to do so would concede 
that at least some discrimination was present. 90 If the court were to be 
fully persuaded by either side's case - either the plaintiff's argument 
that a discriminatory motive was relied on or the defendant's argu-
ment that only permissible factors were present - the court's resolu-
tion of the facts would be simple: enter judgment (perhaps summary 
judgment) for the party with the more compelling evidence. But when 
a case proceeds beyond the summary judgment stage and the court 
concludes that mixed motives were involved, the court implicitly con-
cedes that the resolution of the facts is not so easy - it is somewhat 
convinced by the explanations of each side. In this way, "mixed-mo-
tive" cases simply represent the difficult cases. Any "single" motive 
case is so deemed because the court finds the evidence on one side to 
be especially compelling, and therefore conclusive. Indeed, employers 
will rarely, if ever, remain silent in the face of a nonfrivolous Title VII 
claim. Since even the most egregious violators surely can fashion 
some legitimate reason explaining their action, every case is potentially 
a mixed-motive case, pitting the plaintiff's asserted discriminatory rea-
son(s) against the employer's asserted legitimate one(s). As the Solici-
tor General argued in Hopkins: 
Congress recognized that virtually every disparate treatment case will to 
some degree entail multiple causes. Thus, if the elements of Title VII 
liability or the burden of persuasion differs depending on the "proper" 
categorization of a case as involving either mixed or single motives, the 
predictable result will be pointless litigation over what label should 
be affixed to cases, rather than on the ultimate question [of 
discrimination]. 91 
89. This conclusion is apparent given the various definitions of the mixed-motive case. See 
supra note 7. The AFL-CIO has argued that the link between discriminatory motivation and the 
employer's decision is "almost always self-evident" in mixed-motive cases, "since the discrimina-
tory evaluation process is by definition one made discriminatory by the very fact that the em-
ployer took or is taking sex-based considerations into account and is giving those considerations a 
negative weight in its decisionmaking." Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 15, Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988) (emphasis in original). 
90. "[A] case becomes one of mixed motivation not because a plaintiff or defendant charac-
terizes it that way - but rather because the trier of fact determines that both lawful and unlaw-
ful motives contributed to an employment decision." Brief for Respondent at 31 n.15, Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988). 
91. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 
87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988) (emphasis in original). 
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In its attempts to apply a mixed-motive analysis in non-Title VII 
contexts, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that resort to a mixed-
motive analysis reflects a concession that the presented facts do not 
lean strongly in either party's favor. For example, in Hunter v. Under-
wood, 92 the Court faced an 84-year-old provision of the Alabama con-
stitution that, the appellees alleged, had been enacted out of a desire to 
disenfranchise blacks.93 The Court first noted the established constitu-
tional doctrine that legislative "action will not be held unconstitu-
tional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate 
impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is re-
quired to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."94 Con-
cluding that the provision was plainly grounded in discriminatory 
motives,95 the Court nonetheless acknowledged the state's assertion 
that disenfranchisement of poor whites was a "parallel" motivation96 
- apparently a problem of mixed motives.97 Yet the Court found the 
evidence of impermissible motivation to be so compelling - aided by, 
for example, powerful expert testimony at trial,98 and the state coun-
sel's concession at oral argument that "I would be very blind and na-
ive [to] ... say that race was not a factor in the enactment of [s]ection 
182 "99 - that it held race to be a "but for" cause of the provision 
without doing the mixed-motive analysis that it said the case would 
require. 100 
92. 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
93. At issue was Article VIII, section 182 of the Alabama constitution, which disen-
franchised persons convicted of, among other crimes, "any infamous crime or crime involving 
moral turpitude." 471 U.S. at 223 n.*. 
94. 471 U.S. at 227-28 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)). 
95. "[The court of appeals'] opinion presents a thorough analysis of the evidence and demon-
strates conclusively that § 182 was enacted with the intent of disenfranchising blacks." 471 U.S. 
at 229. 
96. "[A]ppellants make the further argument that the existence of a permissible motive for 
§ 182, namely, the disenfranchisement of poor whites, trumps any proof of a parallel impermissi-
ble motive." 471 U.S. at 231-32. 
97. Although the Court did not use the term "mixed motives," it favorably quoted the court 
of appeals' opinion from below, which did use the term. 471 U.S. at 225 (quoting 730 F.2d 614, 
617 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
98. 471 U.S. at 230-31. 
99. 471 U.S. at 230. 
100. At one point, the Court stated that ''Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy supply the 
proper analysis" for resolving the case. 471 U.S. at 232. Nevertheless, the Court refused to 
follow the reasoning of those cases, which call for a "same decision" analysis, stating: "[A]n 
additional purpose to discriminate against poor whites would not render nugatory the purpose to 
discriminate against all blacks, and it is beyond peradventure that the latter was a 'but-for' moti-
vation for the enactment of§ 182." 471 U.S. at 232. Apparently the strength of the appellee's 
evidence made the "but-for" determination "beyond peradventure" and made the mixed-motive 
aspect of the case irrelevant. 
Cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). At 
issue in that case was the village's denial of a proposed rezoning that would have allowed the 
respondents to build integrated housing facilities. The evidence of discriminatory motivation 
there was so weak - the respondents had "simply failed to carry their burden of proving that 
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In Mt. Healthy, the paradigm mixed-motive case, the evidence of 
both permissible and impermissible motivation was compelling. The 
superintendent's memo explicitly stated that both the teacher's "nota-
ble lack of tact" and his report to the radio station led to his dismis-
sal.101 Unlike Hunter, the evidence of the controlling motivation was 
not conclusive either way, and the Court, confronted with the eviden-
tiary conflict, devised the "same decision" test to glean the impact of 
the discriminatory factor on the discharge.102 
Lower courts have engaged in similar evidence-weighing in Title 
VII mixed-motive cases. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
has recognized this, stating in one case that because the plaintiff "did 
not establish that race was a discernible factor in the school district's 
refusal to hire her, this is not a mixed motive case."103 Similarly, the 
D.C. Circuit has stated that the mixed-motive "test'~ comes into play 
only when the plaintiff "has already discharged [the] burden of dem-
onstrating that the employment decision was based on impermissible 
bias."104 
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision," 429 U.S. at 270- that 
the Court did not find mixed motives despite acknowledging the difficulty of discerning legisla-
tive motivation. 429 U.S. at 268-71. As in Hunter, the Court might easily have found mixed 
motives ifthe plaintiff's evidence had been stronger. Instead, the Court was left to speculate that 
had such evidence existed, then it would have followed a mixed-motive analysis: 
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory 
purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such 
proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same 
decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered ...• 
See ML Healthy .... 
429 U.S. at 271 n.21 (citation omitted). 
101. ML Healthy. 429 U.S. at 283 n.l. 
102. The National Labor Relations.Board recognized the derivative nature of the "mixed-
motive" label when it adopted ML Healthy for unfair labor practices cases. It noted that "the 
distinction between a [single-motive] case and a dual motive case is sometimes difficult to dis-
cern .•.. [It] seldom can be made until after the presentation of all relevant evidence." Wright 
Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1170 n.5 (1980) (emphasis added). Further, the 
distinction between single- and mixed-motive cases depends on the court's assessment of the 
relative weight accorded to the evidence. The Board continued: "[I]n a [single-motive] situation, 
the employer's affirmative defense of business justification [i.e., its legitimate reason] is wholly 
without meriL If, however, the affirmative defense has at least some merit a "dual motive" may 
exist .... " 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170 n.5 (emphasis added). 
103. Boudreaux v. Helena-West Helena School Dist., 819 F.2d 854, 856 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987). 
See also Powell v. Missouri State Highway & Transp. Dept., 822 F.2d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(finding the facts not to, involve mixed motives because plaintiff did not establish "that race 
played any part in the decision"); Crutchfield v. Maverick Tube Corp., 664 F.Supp. 455, 458 
(E.D.Mo. 1987) ("The Court finds that sex played no part in plaintiff's discharge and, therefore, 
the mixed motive analysis is inappropriate."). 
104. 825 F.2d at 471. The Hopkins case starkly presents the evidence-weighing prerequisite 
of the mixed-motive categorization. The court reached its i~termediate conclusion that discrimi-
nation played a role in the plaintiff's partnership evaluation by accepting her evidence, aided by 
expert testimony, that sex-stereotyping permeated the partners' assessment of her candidacy. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant questioned the sufficiency of that initial evidence, 
arguing that "this case should never have been characterized as a 'mixed motives' case at all. 
Here, the only indication of the existence of 'mixed motives' was the gossamer evidence provided 
by [the plaintiff's expert] who purported to find stereotyping in some of the expressions used ... 
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When viewed in light of the evidence-weighing that mixed-motive 
cases embody, the analytical framework provided by a mixed-motive 
approach becomes little more than a way for courts to restate, in con-
venient terms, their version of the proper test of Title VII causation. 
The issue for courts in mixed-motive cases is: given the presence, at 
least in some degree, of a discriminatory motive, is the nexus between 
that motive and the employer's actual decision strong enough to im-
pose Title VII liability? But the inquiry devised for these cases -
whether termed as a "same decision" test or its equivalent, the "but 
for" test105 - is simply a statement of the standard for Title VII cau-
sation in general. It reflects one way of applying the statute's prohibi-
tion on employment actions taken "because of" or "on the basis of" 
discrimination. Indeed, the same-decision analysis takes no explicit 
account of any legitimate motive on the employer's part whatsoever. 
It focuses only on the alleged impermissible reason and whether the 
same decision would have been reached if that reason was not present. 
Before courts can reach this causation question, they must resolve 
the question of proof: did the plaintiff show that a discriminatory mo-
tive existed? By implying that the employer's legitimate motive is of 
equal doctrinal concern as the illegitimate one, the "mixed motive" 
label unnecessarily diverts attention from the logical progression from 
proof to causation: the question of whether the presence of a discrimi-
natory motive has been proved precedes the question of whether that 
motive, once it has been proved, was the but-for cause of the em-
ployer's action. A more useful approach than the mixed-motive analy-
sis is to characterize cases on the questions that present themselves at 
the first stage of that progression: was a discriminatory motive pres-
ent, and does the plaintiff seek to prove it by direct or indirect 
evidence? 
V. THE DIRECT/INDIRECT EVIDENCE DISTINCTION 
A. The Requirement of Direct Evidence 
A court's determination that a given case involves "mixed" mo-
tives reflects an underlying acknowledgement that the plaintiff has 
proven discrimination by direct evidence. Specifically, the theory of a 
mixed-motive case - that the employment action was the product of 
both permissible and impermissible factors - assumes that the court 
has reached an intermediate conclusion that some discrimination, in 
whatever degree, 106 was present. That conclusion must be reached by 
in the written evaluations of [the plaintiff's] performance." Brief for Petitioner at 20, Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988). 
105. See supra note 100. 
106. It is uncertain precisely how much discrimination the plaintiff must show to satisfy the 
initial proof hurdle. The Eighth Circuit requires that the plaintiff show that discrimination 
played a "discernible part" in the employer's decision. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th 
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direct evidence. 
Title VII plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment can proceed j.n one 
of two ways: by presenting indirect evidence and using the three-
tiered route of McDonnell Douglas, or, alternately, by presenting di-
rect evidence. While McDonnell Douglas is the more widely used 
analysis, 107 it is inappropriate when the plaintiff presents direct evi-
dence. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 108 the Supreme 
Court made clear that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable 
where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination. The 
shifting burdens of proof ... are designed to assure that the 'plaintiff 
[has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.' " 109 
This conclusion is compelled by the underlying policy of the three-
stage inferential process: the test is appropriate when only circum-
stantial evidence is available. "It would be illogical, indeed ironic, to 
hold a Title VII plaintiff presenting direct evidence of a defendant's 
intent to discriminate to a more stringent burden of proof, or to allow 
a defendant to meet that direct proof by merely articulating, but not 
proving, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action."110 
While it is recognized that the McDonnell Douglas approach is not 
appropriate when the plaintiff proceeds by direct evidence, 111 it should 
Cir. 1985) (en bane). Other circuits have required a showing that discrimination was a "signifi-
cant" or "substantial" factor. See, e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 n.9 (11th Cir. 
1985); Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984); Whiting v. 
Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 
825 F.2d 458, 470 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 s. Ct. 1106 (1988); 1 c. SULLIVAN, M. 
ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 266-67 (2d ed. 1988); Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued 
Oct. 31, 1988). 
107. See supra note 19. 
108. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). 
109. Id. at 121 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 
1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)). For a critique of Thurston and an argument that McDonnell Douglas 
and direct evidence can be reconciled, see Edwards, supra note 10, at 1-4, 32-35. 
110. Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1204 (1984). 
The inapplicability of McDonnell Douglas in direct-evidence cases is well noted by the courts 
and commentators. See, e.g., Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987), and cases 
cited therein; 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 19, at§ 50.62 at 10-70 ("The plaintiff's 
proof by means of direct evidence does not merely fulfill his burden of showing a prima facie 
case; it suffices to make his entire case and throws the burden on the defendant of proving, at 
least by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have rejected the plaintiff even in the 
absence of discrimination.") (footnotes omitted); cases cited in B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra 
note 4, at 297 n.5 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1985); Brief for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
as Amicus Curiae at 50 n.40, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 
1988). 
111. The Court in Thurston did not provide a definition of "direct evidence." But it is plausi-
ble that the Court adopted the same view as this Note: direct evidence is defined as evidence of 
the employer's intent sufficient to allow a factfinder to conclude that "the employer intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff," see supra note 11, if the employer were to remain silent in the 
face of it. The Court might also have intended a tautological explanation: direct evidence is that 
which makes invocation of the McDonnell Douglas framework unnecessary, since the plaintiff 
has access to evidence adequate to make a case of discrimination. Thurston itself, decided under 
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also be recognized that the approach is equally incompatible with 
"mixed motives." The three-stage inferential inquiry is a process of 
elimination: the plaintiff, at stage I, rules out "the two most common" 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action; 112 the em-
ployer, at stage II, provides one or several legitimate reasons for the 
job action; and the plaintiff, at stage III, attempts to prove that the 
stage II reasons advanced by the employer are false. 113 But in a 
mixed-motive case, the employer's explanation must by definition be 
accepted as true; further, an impermissible explanation must be pres-
ent and accepted as true. The actual reason for the employer's action 
in a mixed-motive case is the combination of both explanations. A 
McDonnell Douglas, single-motive case, on the other hand, recognizes 
that if the employer's articulated explanation were true, the employer 
would win, and an inference of discrimination from the ruling-out of 
legitimate reasoµs would be untenable. 114 Instead, the McDonnell 
Douglas inquiry requires the plaintiff to show that "all legitimate rea-
sons . . . have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's 
actions." 115 
Some courts have incorrectly suggested that it is possible to follow 
the McDonnell Douglas inquiry and still reach a conclusion of "mixed 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1982), involved an airline's 
policy of mandatory retirement for cockpit employees at age 60. Discrimination in such a scena-
rio clearly is proven by direct evidence, since the policy facially discriminates on the basis of age. 
In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, decided four years before Thurston, the 
Court said that a plaintiff could attempt to prove pretext under the McDonnell Douglas inquiry 
"either directly •.. or indirectly." 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). Given the subsequent statement in 
Thurston, the Court could not here have been referring to direct evidence, but rather to a plain-
tiff's means of disputing the employer's legitimate explanation and thereby strengthening the 
circumstantial inference the plaintiff created with the prima facie case. The plaintiff may use 
circumstantial evidence either directly by showing discriminatory intent or indirectly by showing 
that the employer's explanation is unpersuasive. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
112. The two reasons are that the plaintiff is unqualified and the position is unavailable. 
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). 
113. When a plaintiff proves pretext "indirectly,'' as suggested in Burdine, see supra note 111, 
she cancels out the employer's explanation - and thereby sustains the burden of persuading the 
court that the employer intentionally discriminated - expressly, "by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 450 U.S. at 256. When she does so 
"directly," she cancels out the explanation by showing that the employer did not likely act for 
that reason, such that "a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer." 450 U.S. at 
256. This latter tack builds one circumstantial inference atop another: the prima facie case 
allows the court to infer discrimination, and the plaintiff's rebuttal allows the court to infer that 
the employer's response is untrue. 
114. As Justice Blackmun recognized, "[T]he McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a 
plaintiff prevail when at the third stage of a Title VII trial he demonstrates that the legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not the true reason for the employment 
decision." United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 718 (1983) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Note, supra note 19, at 1121 ("[D]isproof of the defendant's 
explanation entitles the plaintiff to prevail by a process of elimination."). In effect, then, the 
McDonnell Douglas inquiry does not require any evidence of discrimination other than the em-
ployment action itself and the employer's failure to explain it credibly. 
115. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis added). The 
Fumco Court also stated: "A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of 
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motives." 116 A court might, for example, find the employer's explana-
tion less than compelling on its face, but also find that the plaintiff has 
failed to discredit the explanation adequately .117 In such a case, the 
temptation may be to conclude that each party is partially correct and 
that mixed motives are present: the circumstantial evidence is compel-
ling, while the legitimate explanation is credible, though weak. Courts 
that adopt such a posture misconstrue the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work. That framework is not meant to weaken the burden that a 
plaintiff must bear to convince the court that intentional discrimina-
tion. took place; rather, it exists to facilitate the plaintiff's proof of her 
case given the likelihood that she will be unable to obtain direct evi-
dence of intent. 118 Although McDonnell Douglas makes an indirect-
evidence plaintiff's procedural hurdles less onerous, it still requires 
that the plaintiff ultimately persuade the court that intentional dis-
crimination occurred.119 Where a plaintiff has inadequately proven 
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than 
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 438 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added). 
Professor Brodin has provided a similar explanation for McDonnell Douglas' limitation to the 
single-motive scenario: . 
Put in terms of the pretext analysis, the mixed-motive causation problem arises when a 
challenged personnel decision was motivated by both pretextual (unlawful) and nonpretex-
tual (lawful) reasons .... It would appear, however, that the pretext approach is based on an 
assumption of single-motive decisionmaking, with the employer seeking to cover up an un-
lawful motive with one or a number of lawful reasons which are not the true reasons behind 
the action. If the employer's' stated reasons are shown to be pretext, then in fact there is no 
real dual motive - there is only the unlawful motive. 
Brodin, supra note 7, at 301. n.40. 
116. An example of this is the recent analysis by the Second Circuit suggesting that plaintiffs 
can prove by a McDonnell Douglas inquiry the initial discrimination required for a mixed-motive 
analysis. 
When plaintiffs win, the only difference between a dual motive case and a simple McDonnell 
Douglas case is that in the former case the fact-finder has concluded that the improper 
reason has been proved to exist . • . to a degree sufficient to warrant a finding that the 
improper reason was a substantial cause of the adverse action. 
Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988). This statement fails to 
acknowledge that McDonnell Douglas is inconsistent with a mixed-motives analysis. See supra 
notes 111-15 and accompanying text. It also appears to rely on the false premise that plaintiffs 
can only prove discrimination through McDonnell Douglas - ignoring the possibility of direct 
evidence of discrimination: "[T]he fact-finder who concludes a case by applying [a mixed-motive 
analysis] will have already found ... that the plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving the 
existence of an improper reason for the adverse action. In such circumstances, the case is really 
an application of both McDonnell Douglas and Mt. Healthy." 839 F.2d at 878. But see 839 F.2d 
at 878 n.6 (factfinder could apply mixed-motive analysis without requiring an initial McDonnell 
Douglas finding if it "assume[s]" that the improper rea5on exists). 
117. For example, a plaintiff might present a solid prima facie case that his discharge was 
racially motivated, which the employer could rebut by articulating that the plaintiff had poor 
work habits and was insubordinate. The plaintiff may be unable to persuade the court that these 
explanations are pretextual, but might also bring to bear evidence of a supervisor's occasional 
inquiries about the plaintiff's involvement in a local civil rights organization. 
118. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. See also Texas Dept. of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) ("In a Title VII case, the allocation of burdens 
and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progres-
sively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination."). 
119. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally 
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pretext, even if the prima facie presumption is strong and the em-
ployer's explanation weak, the plaintiff has failed to carry the burden 
of persuasion and should lose. 12° Courts that label such a case one of 
"mixed motives" improperly apply the McDonnell Douglas inquiry 
and grant to plaintiffs a favor the Court never intended. 121 Further, by 
imposing a shift of the burden of persuasion to the defendant in such 
cases - where the plaintiff has proven the initial discrimination by a 
McDonnell Douglas inference - courts ignore the defendant's almost 
de minimus burden merely to "articulate" a legitimate explanation. In 
effect, these courts find the requisite discrimination for a mixed-motive 
analysis from the defendant's failure to persuade the court that the 
nondiscriminatory reason is true, an unfair imposition under Burdine. 
Indeed, the Court itself has rejected the view that the indirect-evidence 
approach might apply to a mixed-motive scenario.122 
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. The McDonnell Douglas 
division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expedi-
tiously and fairly to this ultimate question." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (citations omitted). 
120. The defendant's stage II burden only to "articulate" - and not to "prove" or "per-
suade" - a nondiscriminatory explanation compels this conclusion. McDonnell Douglas re· 
quires only that the defendant state a reason in response to the presumption raised at stage I: 
"The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered 
reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact •••• " Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 254 (citation omitted). See also Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) 
(per curiam). A mixed-motive analysis assumes that the defendant's proffered reason is proven 
and in fact partially explains why it made the challenged decision. 
121. In the above example, see supra note 117, the plaintiff's failure to rebut adequately the 
employer's articulated explanations means that he has failed to carry the burden of persuasion, 
and should not prevail. The direct evidence (of the supervisor's inquiries), however, may be 
adequate to support a direct-evidence inquiry and prove the existence of some discrimination, 
which would make a determination about causation appropriate. It is essential, though, that the 
court keep separate the direct- and indirect-evidence inquiries. Because these inquiries reflect 
only the court's analytic models for evaluating the evidence, and not procedural roadmaps for 
the progression of trial, the court can consider all the evidence presented and then determine 
which inquiry is appropriate, given the nature of that evidence. 
122. In NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., the Court noted that Burdine "discussed only 
the situation in which the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the 
'true' motives behind the decision." 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1982) (emphasis added). 
However, the Court provided one caveat. In McDonnell Douglas it stated that the inquiry is 
flexible and should be adapted to varying fact patterns. ''The facts necessarily will vary in Title 
VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof required • • • is not necessarily 
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. 
It is apparent, however, that this caveat applies only to the Court's description of the require-
ments for a stage I prima facie case. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, appended the foot-
noted caveat after listing the prima facie requirements, not after describing the larger three-stage 
inquiry. See 411 U.S. at 802. Furthermore, in Burdine, where Justice Powell repeated the stage I 
requirements, he stated that "this standard is not inflexible" and then quoted the McDonnell 
Douglas caveat. 450 U.S. at 253 n.6 (emphasis added). See also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) ("The prima facie case method established in 
McDonnell Douglas was 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.' ") (emphasis ad-
ded). Thus, the Court intended that the tripartite analysis shoul~ be applicable to contexts other 
than the racial, failure-to-hire 'Situation presented by the facts of McDonnell Douglas. Subse-
quent application of McDonnell Douglas by the Supreme Court and lower courts bears this expla-
nation out. See supra note 20. 
Moreover, the refusal of some lower courts to follow a rigid, three-step procedure in McDon· 
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In direct-evidence cases, by contrast, it is possible to consider any 
number of motivating factors without contradicting the theory on 
which the plaintiff's case is predicated. The court's analysis is more 
straightforward than in the three-stage process because it simply 
weighs the evidence presented by each party. If the court is persuaded 
that the motivations advanced by both sides contributed to the deci-
sion, the case becomes a "mixed-motive" case. The crucial difference 
between this and an indirect-evidence, single-motive case is the ability 
of the court to find that multiple motives did exist - a finding not 
possible with an inferential inquiry. 
The shifts in burdens of persuasion devised by courts for use in 
mixed-motive cases illustrate the necessity of direct evidence for a 
"mixed-motive" designation. Close examination of these cases reveals 
that the courts are concerned not with a conflict in motives, but with 
attaining results consistent with their views of the policies of Title VII: 
imposing a sanction on the employer that has engaged in wrongdoing 
without providing a windfall of relief for the victimized plaintiff. In 
Transportation Management, for example, the Court explained that 
once a plaintiff establishes that some discrimination has occurred, the 
burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to punish it for its imper-
missible behavior: 
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is de-
clared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the 
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he 
knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created not by inno-
cent activity but by his own wrongdoing. 123 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reasoned that 
once the plaintiff has established that discrimination played a role in 
ne// Douglas disparate treatment cases, see, e.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 
1281-82 (7th Cir. 1977) ("McDonne// Douglas does not require a three-step judicial minuet of 
procedure under which the defendant must come forward with evidence if certain facts in plain-
tiff's case establish a prima facie case .... "), likely stems from a recognition that the McDonne// 
Douglas inquiry simply aids the court's consideration of the evidence. The trial does not proceed 
in the trifurcated fashion that the formula suggests. Rather, the plaintiff, in the case-in-chief, 
presents all her evidence initially, including rebuttal of the defendant's anticipated legitimate 
explanations. See Note, supra note 19, at 1119 n.39 ("McDonne// Douglas prescribed an analyti-
cal rather than a procedural framework,'' and "does not contemplate a trifurcated trial."). 
123. 462 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added). The Court accepted the Board's construction of the 
employer's burden as an affirmative defense. "The Board has ..• chosen to recognize .•. what it 
designates as an affirmative defense that the employer has the burden of sustaining. We are 
unprepared to hold that this is an impermissible construction of the [National Labor Relations] 
Act." 462 U.S. at 402. 
Several lower courts, applying this reasoning to Title VII, have also imposed the burden of 
persuasion on the defendant to prove that the same decision would have been made absent dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Black, 778 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane) ("[T]he 
burden of production and persuasion shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant.") (emphasis in 
original); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[W]hen a plaintiff has proved 
by direct evidence that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in an employment deci-
sion, the burden is on the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same 
decision would have been made absent the discrimination."). 
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the employment action, "it is unreasonable and destructive of the pur-
poses of Title VII to require the plaintiff to establish in addition the 
difficult hypothetical proposition that, had there been no discrimina-
tion, the employment decision would have been made in his favor." 124 
These courts have also noted that even if the plaintiff has already 
proved the existence of discrimination, she should not be awarded a 
windfall if the discrimination was not the controlling factor in the em-
ployer's decision. 125 The shifting burdens of the mixed-motive inquiry 
are thus premised on twin concerns: burdening an employer that has, 
to some extent, considered illegal factors; and avoiding unjust enrich-
ment to a plaintiff who, despite some discrimination, has not been 
truly "victimized" because the adverse action would have been taken 
anyway. 126 These concerns only arise, of course, if the plaintiff has 
first presented, by direct evidence, proof that the employer did con-
sider the asserted illegal factors. 
In lower-court "mixed-motive" cases, the presence of direct evi-
dence is apparent. In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 127 for instance, the 
plaintiff pointed to numerous internal memoranda and statements by 
the employer indicating stereotypical attitudes toward the plaintiff, if 
not outright aex discrimination. 128 Similarly, in Mt. Healthy, the su-
perintendent told the plaintiff that the constitutionally protected activ-
ity was a partial reason for the discharge.129 These courts were able to 
label the cases "mixed-motive" because of the plaintiffs' initial ability 
124. Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court in Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse relied on this aspect of the Toney case. 825 F.2d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. 
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988). 
125. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86; Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322 ("Unless the imper-
missible racial motivation was a but-for cause ofBibbs's losing the promotion, to place him in the 
job now would award him a windfall."). 
126. It is not necessary to view "victimization" under Title VII in this result-oriented fash-
ion. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
127. 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, (1988). 
128. The trial court in Hopkins credited, and the appeals court accepted, evidence that the 
head of the plaintiff's division - her "most fervent supporter" - suggested that the firm would 
view the plaintiff's candidacy for partnership more favorably if she would "walk more femi-
ninely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry." 825 F.2d at 463. The court of appeals later stated that the plaintiff had "shown 
by direct evidence" that unlawful discrimination existed, and that "this crucial finding justifies 
the burden-shifting rule we apply in this case." 825 F.2d at 471 n.9 (emphasis added). 
One issue before the Supreme Court in Hopkins is the probative value of evidence of "sex 
stereotyping" to prove sex discrimination under Title VII. See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 24-26; Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae. 
129. The memo explaining the discharge pointed to Doyle's improper behavior at the school 
and his "leak" to the radio station. See 429 U.S. at 283 n.1. 
Other mixed-motive cases also reveal direct evidence. In Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320 
(8th Cir. 1985) (en bane), the court found that the key member of the committee evaluating the 
plaintiff for promotion had referred to the plaintiff as a "black militant" and to another black 
employee as "boy" and "nigger." In NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 396 
(1983), the complainant's supervisor, upon discovering that the complainant sought to encourage 
his co-workers to join the Teamsters, "referred to [him] as two-faced, and promised to get even 
with him," and later a5ked a co-worker, "What's with Sam and the Union?" 462 U.S. at 396. 
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to present credible direct evidence of discrimination. Only after cred-
iting the plaintiffs' evidence did the courts address the problems raised 
by the presence of conflicting motives by shifting the intermediate bur-
den to the defendant and imposing a "same decision" test of causation 
to assess the impact of the impermissible motive. 
B. Workability of the Direct/Indirect Evidence Distinction 
The distinction between cases involving direct evidence and those 
involving indirect evidence, already recognized in Title VII case 
law, 130 should be the central method of analysis in disparate treatment 
adjudication. By focusing on the type of evidence the plaintiff 
presents, rather than the number of motives, courts can avoid the doc-
trinal clutter that the "mixed motive" label creates. This approach 
rejects the concern with the quantity of motives and forces courts to 
focus on the crucial, but distinct, inquiries into the proof of illicit mo-
tives and whether those motives played a causal role in the challenged 
employment action. 
Under this approach, the court should, at the initial proof inquiry, 
consider the character of the evidence to determine whether it is direct 
or indirect, and then consider whether the discriminatory motive, if 
shown, caused the employment action. 131 If the plaintiff relies on indi-
rect evidence, a court will follow the McDonnell Douglas framework at 
the proof stage, and a subsequent causation inquiry will be unneces-
sary. If a plaintiff prevails under McDonnell Douglas, and successfully 
persuades the court that the employer's asserted reasons were pretex-
tual, the factfinder concludes, ipso facto, that the employer intention-
ally discriminated, and that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. No 
separate inquiry into causation is required; it is assuµied. 132 But if, 
instead, the plaintiff relies on credible direct evidence, the court should 
then proceed to a causation inquiry.133 
130. See supra Part V.A. 
131. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. On the various approaches to the causa-
tion inquiry, see supra Part II. 
132. "The very showing that the defendant's asserted reason was a pretext for race is also a 
demonstration that but for his race plaintiff would have gotten the job: That is what pretext 
means: a reason/or the employment decision that is not the true reason." Bibbs v. Block, 778 
F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (emphasis in original). 
133. It is unclear exactly how "direct" the direct evidence must be for the court to employ 
the direct-evidence approach rather than the McDonnell Douglas approach. In its amicus brief in 
Hopkins, the United States argued that "a rule that required the burden of proof on causation to 
shift to the defendant would present severe problems in defining the 'threshold' showing that the 
plaintiff would have to make before such a shift would take place." Brieffor the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 20, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. Argued Oct. 31, 1988). 
The parties in Hopkins are in fundamental disagreement about whether the plaintiff's evidence 
meets that threshold. Compare Brief for the Petitioner at 4-15 with Brief for the Respondent at 
2-12. 
The approach embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence seems most appropriate. See FED. 
R. Ev10. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less prob-
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This process makes an intermediate finding of "mixed motives" 
irrelevant. It takes no account of the quantity of the employer's mo-
tives, but looks instead to the instrumental issues of whether a discrim-
inatory motive was present, and if so, what effect this motive had on 
the employer's decision.134 As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, which 
has already explicitly embraced this process: 
[T]he McDonnell Douglas method of proving a prima facie case pertains 
primarily, if not exclusively, to situations where direct evidence of dis-
crimination is lacking. . . . If the evidence consists of direct testimony 
that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive, and the trier of 
fact accepts this testimony, the ultimate issue of discrimination is 
proved .... "[D]efendant can rebut only by proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the same decision would have been reached even 
absent the presence of that factor."135 
Althoug~ the case factually involved multiple motives, 136 the notion of 
able than it would be without the evidence."); FED. R. Evm. 402 ("All relevant evidence is 
admissible ... , Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."). 
For example, a plaintiff might claim that an interviewer's arguably racist joke is adequate 
direct evidence that her rejection was based on discrimination. The court needs only to make a 
threshold determination whether the evidence of such a joke makes the "fact of consequence" -
discrimination - more or less probable. If, in the course of trial, such evidence is discredited 
(say, by proof that the joke was never made), the direct-evidence aspect of the plaintiff's case is 
lost. The plaintiff then may either present other direct evidence (or risk a directed verdict for the 
defendant), or resort to the indirect-evidence approach of McDonnell Douglas. It is important, 
however, that the court not combine the two approaches, since their tenets are inconsistent. See 
supra notes 106-29 and accompanying text. · 
Statistical evidence, although rarely advanced by an individual disparate treatment plaintiff, 
defies easy characterization as either indirect or direct evidence. On the one hand, statistics, like 
indirect evidence, help create the requisite inference of discrimination. For example, if a plaintiff 
has established a prima facie case of race discrimination, evidence that an employer's work force 
is 99 percent white may create a sufficiently strong inference of wrongdoing that no articulated 
explanation by the employer will be believed. The statistics would support the circumstantial 
inference and would be the "direct" proof of pretext at stage III of which the Burdine Court 
spoke. See supra note 111; see also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 316-17 (2d ed. 
Cum. Supp. 1985) (characterizing statistics as "circumstantial evidence."). 
On the other hand, statistical evidence is like direct evidence because, if believed, it helps 
resolve a matter in issue. See supra note 11. The statistical proof would certainly not be conclu-
sive direct evidence that a particular plaintiff suffered discrimination, but would, like a racist joke 
during an interview, directly support the proposition that discrimination was involved in the 
assessment of this plaintiff. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978) 
(stating that although Title VII requires that each applicant be treated nondiscriminatorily, re-
gardless of the composition of the current work force, statistical proof is "not wholly irrelevant" 
to the issue of the employer's intent in an individual disparate treatment case). The question of 
the proper classification of statistical proof may be academic, however, since it appears that few 
individual disparate treatment plaintiffs rely on statistics. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra 
note 4, at 1331 (statistics are crucial in disparate impact cases and disparate treatment class 
actions). 
134. It is crucial to recognize that a Title VII trial proceeds as does any other civil trial. The 
analytical frameworks under discussion simply guide the court in its factfinding and application 
of the law to the facts of each case. 
135. Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1204 (1984) (quoting Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th 
Cir. 1982)) (emphasis in original); see also 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 19, at§ 50.62 
(1987). 
136. The trial court credited evidence that the first employee assigned to a newly posted job 
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"mixed motives" never entered the court's reasoning. Rather, the 
court placed the facts under the rubric of direct evidence, and from 
there applied its particular test of Title VII causation, expressly re-
jecting the trial court's use of the McDonnell Douglas formula. 137 
Many courts, however, have become bogged down in mixed-mo-
tive terminology without recognizing that the true basis for distin-
guishing the mixed-motive case is evidentiary. For example, the 
Eighth Circuit, which has given perhaps more attention to the mixed-
motive issue than any court, 138 applies a mixed-motive, burden-shift-
ing analysis whenever the plaintiff can show a "discernible" level of 
discrimination, 139 but ignores how a plaintiff might show that "dis-
cernible" level. Another court has suggested that plaintiffs can offer 
"direct proof of discrimination, circumstantial proof of discrimination 
or proof of mixed motivation."140 
Much of the confusion attendant to the mixed-motive cases can be 
traced to the failure to recognize the direct/indirect evidence distinc-
tion. In indirect-evidence cases, defendants, in presenting their cases, 
often will advance a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation with-
out clarifying whether that reason was the sole, or simply an addi-
tional, reason for their action. Presumably, plaintiffs are similarly 
ambiguous in their own case-in-chief. The choice is left to the court: 
if it perceives the alleged discriminatory reason to be the sole reason, it 
will apply McDonnell Douglas, but if it perceives the issue to be 
in the plant washroom was more qualified than the plaintiff (a legitimate reason) but also credited 
evidence of a statement by a supervisor that if the plaintiff, a woman, were assigned to the job, 
then "every woman in the plant would want to go into the washroom." 715 F.2d at 1553-54. 
137. 715 F.2d at 1556-57. For a critique of Bell, see Edwards, supra note 10, at 17-31. 
Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987), takes a similar approach. Fields involved 
the denial of tenure to a faculty member. The trial court found that the plaintiff's department 
"was generally permeated with sexual discrimination of which the plaintiff was in fact a victim,'' 
but also found that the plaintiff had serious teaching deficiencies. 817 F.2d at 933. The court of 
appeals held that "when a plaintiff has proved by direct evidence that unlawful discrimination 
was a motivating factor in an employment decision, the burden is on the employer to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made absent the discrimi-
nation." 817 F.2d at 937. 
138. The court granted an en bane hearing in Bibbs expressly to revisit the mixed-motive 
question, and the en bane decision's five separate opinions reflect a sharp divergence of views on 
the issue. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane). 
139. 778 F.2d at 1322. 
140. Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 864 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 495 
(1987) (emphasis added). Opinions in other circuits betray a similar confusion. For example, in 
Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741F.2d1163 (9th Cir. 1984), the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit noted that an employer may be liable upon a plaintiff's proof that discrimi-
nation was "a significant factor" in the decision, but neglects to mention the means by which a 
plaintiff would make that proof. It referred only to the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line of cases, 
suggesting that no alternative method of proof under Title VII existed. 741 F.2d at 1166. In 
addition, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Goostree v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d 
854 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987), suggested that three kinds of cases exist 
under Title VII: McDonnell Douglas, "a dual motive case or a case in which direct evidence of 
discrimination is available." 796 F.2d at 863 (emphasis added). 
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whether the alleged reason was the "but for" reason, it will apply a 
Mt. Healthy mixed-motive analysis. 141 Quantifying motives is both 
difficult and confusing. 
If a plain distinction is made between plaintiffs who rely on direct 
evidence and those who do not, the court's choice of inquiry is clear, 
ami it need not rely on a quantitative judgment about whether a stated 
reason was the sole reason or one of many.142 Moreover, the distinc-
tion prevents the erroneous perception that a case involving mixed 
motives is uniquely difficult and merits special analysis. Instead, 
courts can step away from a "mixed motive" label and fit fact patterns 
into one of the two categories of proof that Title VII case law already 
recognizes. Further, a focus on the evidentiary nature of the plain-
tiff's case is consistent ·with the Supreme Court's pronouncements that 
Title VII discrimination is a factual and not legal issue.143 The ap-
proach also avoids the confusing procedural situation that occurs 
when courts try to apply a mixed-motives analysis by combining the 
direct- and indirect-evidence inquiries, 144 which are inconsistent. Fi-
141. "Since defendants are not usually clear whether they are advancing a proper reason as 
the sole or only an additional reason for the adverse action, it is not surprising that fact-finders 
are not always· clear as to which analysis they are using." Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 
F.2d 872, 877 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). 
142. It is unclear whether this approach would be useful for other anti-discrimination stat-
utes, such as the ADEA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provide for jury trials, since fashioning 
jury instructions poses special problems. See Stonefield, supra note 4, at 119 n.123 and 170 
n.329. However, the simpler approach that the direct/indirect evidence distinction embodies 
would likely be similarly helpful to a jury. Cf. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 
1102 n.2 (8th Cir. 1988) (mixed-motive analysis applies to cases under ADEA and § 1981). 
It is also unclear whether this approach would be appropriate for Title VII class actions. See 
generally General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra 
note 4, at 1216-70; 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 19, §§ 49.50-49.62. The Supreme 
Court has stated that McDonnell Douglas is relevant only "in a private, non-class action." 411 
U.S. at 800. And it is unlikely that a mixed-motive scenario, where an employer purportedly acts 
for two or several different reasons, could be reconciled with a Title VII class action, which 
requires that a plaintiff prove that the alleged discrimination was the employer's regular or stan-
dard operating procedure. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 
(1977). 
143. "[A] finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact." Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). See also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286-
87 (1982) (a finding of discriminatory intent under seniority provisions of Title VII is factual, 
subject to clearly erroneous standard on appeal); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 
2623 (1987). 
Judge Newman of the Second Circuit has argued, in addition, that the distinction between a 
"pretext" analysis (as in McDonnell Douglas) and a "but for" analysis (as in Mt. Healthy) is 
grounded in "different factual inquiries." NLRB v. Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33, 42 (2d 
Cir. 1981) (Newman, J., concurring). "Simply stated, 'pretext' analysis asks, 'What happened?' 
'But for' analysis asks, 'What would have happened?' " 646 F.2d at 42. 
144. "To determine liability by first applying the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework 
and then, if it appears at the trial that there were mixed motives, to superimpose some burden-
shifting procedure on top of this framework, would be to compound procedural refinements in a 
confusing and ultimately unproductive fashion." Brieffor the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
18, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 1988). See also Brief for 
Respondent at 35-36 (arguing that it is "confusing doctrinally" to have separate tests for mixed-
motive cases. "In all cases - whether involving a single or several motives - [the plaintiff's] 
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nally, the approach correctly distinguishes between the issues of proof 
and causation. Questions such as "but for," "same decision," or 
"substantial factor" - causation questions - would be explicitly re-
served until the court makes the initial determination that the plaintiff 
is relying on direct evidence of discrimination.145 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At best, "mixed-motive" is a term of convenience that allows 
courts to conceptualize fact patterns as they believe they occurred in 
reality. Courts should recognize that the term is unhelpful, and doc-
trinally confusing, when stretched beyond its descriptive limits and 
used as an analytical tool in adjudication of Title VII claims. When a 
court affixes the "mixed-motive" label to a case, it implicitly acknowl-
edges that the case's facts do not initially compel a holding for either 
party, and that a more searching inquiry will be required. The Title 
VII case law has dealt with the tension reflected in these difficult fac-
tual resolutions by devising two distinct lines of analysis that depend 
on the nature· of the plaintiff's evidence. The "µtlxed-motive" para-
digm diverts attention from that effort; a more useful approach is to 
focus on whether the plaintiff's evidence is direct or indirect, and to 
select the appropriate causation inquiry following the initial offer of 
proof. 
By relying on the inherent distinction between direct and indirect 
evidence, and the respective mode of analysis each type of evidence 
embodies, courts also can keep clear the separate issues of proof and 
causation. A plaintiff's attempt to show that the employer considered 
an impermissible factor in making the employment decision involves 
questions of proof; a plaintiff's further attempt to show that the 
proven factor controlled the employer's decision involves questions of 
causation. The "mixed-motive" analysis needlessly combines those is-
sues, but the direct/indirect evidence analysis explicitly recognizes 
that proof issues are primary and that causation issues arise only when 
the proof question is answered by direct evidence. 
Recognition of these crucial distinctions in the Title VII case law 
allows courts to assess plaintiffs' claims of discrimination in a princi-
pled fashion. Discarding the mixed-motive paradigm and replacing it 
with a wider application of the direct/indirect evidence approach can 
burden [of persuasion] is satisfied by proof that discrimination affected the challenged decision. 
And the employer always retains the opportunity to try to limit relief after the violation has been 
established."). 
145. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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help foster the efficient and judicious resolution of disparate treatment 
claims under Title VII. 
- Robert S. Whitman 
